In times of crisis such as the current COVID-19 pandemic and its economic and social repercussions, public governance matters more than ever. Governance arrangements have played a critical role in countries’ immediate responses, and will continue to be crucial both to the recovery and to building a “new normal” once the crisis has passed. The OECD has been taking stock of country responses and developing analysis and recommendations on a range of public governance topics. The resulting evidence-based policy responses below are designed to help governments tackle the crisis and plan for a sustainable recovery. The crisis put governments in a challenging situation where they had to ensure clear, trusted and legitimate decision-making processes informed by the best available evidence, while there were many “unknown unknowns” and the time allowed for dialogue and gathering information was extremely limited. In many cases, this was seen as the best possible approach to deal with such a high level of uncertainty. Issues such as trust in government and trust in expert advice, and the boundary between the experts and the political decision-making interface were brought to the fore by the crisis. Governments were faced with the need to synthesise information from multiple sources and actors, and to use it to feed into governments’ plans and responses to the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis. The pandemic has also challenged government capacities to co-ordinate the quality of evidence, to collect and understand the data as well as to share science and information across countries (OECD, 2020[37]). Many of these challenges were tackled at the highest level through requests from Head of Government’s offices and/or line ministries for scientific advice and technical expertise. The current section examines the institutional set ups that were organised to ensure that centres of government could use scientific advice across countries: their institutional arrangements, functions, and composition and how evidence is gathered, applied and integrated into decision-making processes at the highest level of government in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. The role of evidence also extends to strategic foresight, the use of which to improve decision making during and beyond the crisis is also discussed. Finally, this section discusses the good governance of evidence matters to maintain citizens’ trust in public institutions, which in turn bolsters the effectiveness of government responses to the crisis. Political leaders have requested scientific advice and technical expertise to understand and respond to the current crisis (OECD, 2020[38]), but many countries have had to set up specific mechanisms at arm’s length from the government, (OECD, 2017[39]) with often a direct link to the centre of government. In many cases, policymakers rely on expertise provided by scientific advisory committees, taskforces or expert groups, whereof some were created on an ad hoc basis, while others pre-date the current crisis. A majority of these committees report to the President, Prime Minister, and/or the Ministry of Health.
In addition to these above cases, other situations might have involved integrating expert groups into the discussions of existing government official committees or even bringing experts to some of the government meetings at ministerial level, or including interactions between experts and ministers or even heads of state. During the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis, both the ad hoc structures as well as already existing institutions focused on estimating the trajectory of the virus over time and determining countermeasures, ranging from confinement, medical management, to the use of protective equipment.
Maintaining a trusted connection between decision makers and the scientific suppliers of evidence, is essential for effective decision making in an environment faced with very high uncertainty. For example, by including experts from a variety of backgrounds this ensures that decisions are informed by credible, neutral advice. However, the situation presented countries with many unknown unknowns on the health and epidemiological side, while the social and economic implications were significant. In this context, ensuring the proper governance of evidence to provide information in an intelligible trustworthy and empathic manner has represented a challenge for many. A first challenge is the multidisciplinary nature of the required expertise. Scientific advisory committees may benefit from gathering input not only from health experts, but also from other disciplines. However, despite the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach, many advisory committees are composed mostly of epidemiology, virology, public health, and medical experts.
The consultation of civil society organisations, the private sector, citizens, and international organisations can contribute to the quality of the advice given, as well as add credibility and inclusiveness. For instance, the COVID-19 National Co-ordination Commission in Australia is supported by an Executive Board of Directors drawn from across the business and not-for-profit sectors. The Commission co-ordinates advice to the Australian Government on actions to anticipate and mitigate the economic and social impacts of the global COVID-19 pandemic (Government of Australia, 2020[49]). Finally, most scientific committees -- if not all – work closely with national and international research institutes to co-ordinate and share quality and timely evidence. A different approach used in some countries is to position advisory committees as knowledge brokers rather than producers, by engaging stakeholders in academia and research communities in a productive dialogue.
A second challenge is to maintain the CoG’s role as a gatekeeper, ensuring that political decision makers preserve the necessary space for discretion, while gathering a significant amount of evidence in a short period of time. Customarily, the line ministries/policy lead institutions possess the knowledge and expertise, while the CoG establishes and oversees quality control over the rules and processes. However, a rapid and effective response in the COVID-19 crisis requires multiple actors ‒ specialist bodies/expert groups, politicians and policy-makers ‒ to make final decisions. From the available information, a minority of countries have set formal process to ensure quality, authority and legitimacy of a scientific advice, such as peer reviews, professional standing of an advisor, or a mix of both (OECD, 2018[53]). While the institutional set up may reflect countries’ political or administrative culture, it is important to provide reliable and transparent information if the outcome is to be trusted by the public (OECD, 2018[53]). For instance, some quality control practices use the same data and information to build quality checks when multiple agencies run different models, while other practices suggest shared standards for data and accreditation of information suppliers. Nonetheless, overly standardising quality checks can undermine the legitimacy of the advice or data provided at the local level. There is therefore a need to mutual understanding and trust of the outcomes across different countries and crises. (OECD, 2018[53]). A third challenge is the timing between suppliers and users of evidence: obtaining evidence usually requires more time than the policymakers have to make a decision. Thus, short-term policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis could benefit from collaborative research and sharing of preliminary research findings and data (OECD, 2020[54]) to speed up the collection and analyse of evidence. In global emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, open science policies can accelerate the flow of critical research, data, and ideas to combating the disease (OECD, 2020[37]). In addition, policy makers could use interoperable standards and data-sharing agreements involving public sector, private sector and civil society to strengthen the contribution of open data to the crisis, as well as, to support human and institutional capabilities and mechanisms to facilitate access to data (OECD, 2020[37]). Many countries have established, for instance, specific governance structures to co-ordinate activities within the science, technology, and innovation system to promote coherent and mutually supporting actions across institutions and support the achievement of shared common objectives (OECD, 2020[54]). An interesting example comes from South Africa, where a sub-committee was created under the National Command Council to co-ordinate a national framework for research on COVID-19. Its main tasks include mobilising funding across agencies, reprioritising research strategies, and creating ethical and regulatory frameworks to facilitate research on the virus (OECD, 2020[54]). Evidence shows that in the context of the coronavirus crisis, trust represents a pivotal element for the success of protective measures, which depend on behavioural responses from the public (Betsch, Wieler and Habersaat, 2020[55]). According to the Edelman Trust Barometer, although survey respondents in 11 countries showed a rise in government trust of 65% ‒ the all-time highest ‒ with trust in business decreasing, they also claimed to prefer hearing advice from doctors (80%), scientists (79%), and national health officials (71%), rather than local government leaders (61%) and leaders of their countries (57%) (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2020[56]). As such, in Belgium, scientific experts join government spokespeople to deliver daily public briefings on the pandemic. This also happened in other countries such as in Estonia, where the role of spokesperson in the emergency was shifted from the political level to the chief emergency co-ordinator of the Health Protection Agency. Lessons from previous outbreaks have highlighted the importance of sharing data and publications in order to build and maintain trust between agencies, create preparedness and response systems, and pre-define responsibilities of stakeholders (OECD, 2020[37]). The importance of sharing data has also affected scientific protocols and publications, producing heated debates on the co-ordination of global research and policy implications of some of the findings (ISARIC clinical characterisation group, 2020[57]). Despite the benefits of increased levels of transparency in the decision-making process, in particular as it relates to the scientific advice on which decisions are based, many countries have controlled the nature and quantity of information released to the public. Although the names of scientific committees’ members are often widely accessible, the publication of scientific advice is seldom systematic and often remains at the discretion of the government such as in the UK. Indeed, in a number of advisory committees their members are employed by the government (The Guardian, 2020[58]). Lastly, according to the information collected internally for this paper, the publication of dissenting opinions within the scientific advisory committees is fairly rare. Nevertheless, some countries such as Ireland have adopted a remarkably transparent approach to scientific advice focusing on the pandemic. The National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET) is the official mechanism for co-ordinating the health sector response in Ireland. It strives to facilitate the circulation of information between the Department of Health and its agencies and provides a forum to build consensus on strategic approaches to this crisis. The agendas and minutes of the NPHET’s meetings are systematically published on the Department of Health website (Government of Ireland, 2020[59]). The minutes report dissenting opinions as well as the measures and policies discussed. The knowledge generated and lessons learned regarding scientific advice during crises do not only allow mutual learning and improved use of scientific advice in crisis management in the short-term, but will also permit to explore how this particular crisis was managed in the long-term. It should be a shared responsibility for both the providers and users of such advice to record, systemise, preserve, and disseminate the information related to the COVID-19 crisis (OECD, 2018[53]). Additionally, members of these scientific task forces are seldom under any obligation to disclose potential conflicts of interest at present. These issues surfaced into the media and public discussions in a number of countries given the economic implications of some of the recommendations and the relation between medical experts and some pharmaceutical companies for example. As such, strengthening the integrity standards and managing the risk of policy capture posed by advisory groups, through standards of conduct and conflict-of-interest management procedures, is also key to ensure trust in and accountability in the decision-making process (OECD, 2003[60]). Effective public communication by the centre of government is key in this pandemic to ensure coherence of government messaging both internally and vis-à-vis the public and civil society. Behavioural communication campaigns have played an important role in facilitating the enforcement of regulations, by nudging or instructing wide segments of the population to comply with required measures – from washing their hands, to respecting the provisions of lockdowns and social distancing. Effective communication can help strengthen citizens’ trust in, and engagement with, public policies. It is fundamental in the fight against disinformation and misinformation (OECD, 2020[61]) and (OECD, 2020[62]). Finally, it can help reach specific segments of the population and facilitate dialogue with citizens to ensure that policies and services are adapted to their needs and respond to their expectations. Centres of government and the Head of State or Government they serve have been most prominent in making public addresses about the key policies and milestones of the responses to the pandemic. For example:
In countries where the co-ordination function is less centralised, ministries of health, civil protection agencies and other public institutions have gained more prominence as sources of information and public engagement. Sub-national governments in decentralised or federal countries have also been the primary interlocutors with citizens on their territories. There are advantages for public communication that come from increased co-ordination, such as optimisation of resources, message coherence, and greater audience reach through a larger range of channels and spokespeople. A lack of leadership and organisation on communication from CoGs would reduce coherence and effectiveness, with the risk of setting narratives and developing messages that can be inconsistent or sometimes in conflict with the policy priorities that the CoG aims to communicate. The key risk here includes non-compliance with essential measures such as the wearing of masks for example. Public communications also had to be mobilised as a key means to fight disinformation, which is undermining policy responses and amplifying distrust and concern among citizens. In extreme cases, the “infodemic”, as this surge in misleading and dangerous content was dubbed, was also putting people’s lives at risk. The spread of on- and off-line misinformation, disinformation can reduce compliance with the emergency measures being enacted, thereby threatening their efficacy and public trust in the response. The OECD has proposed key actions to counter this issue, such as supporting a multiplicity of independent fact-checking organisations, ensuring experts are in place to follow-up technological solutions, and improving users’ media, digital and health literacy skills (OECD, 2020[61]). In the past months, centres of government have worked on providing clearer and more definitive information through official channels and media outlets. At the CoG level, the United Kingdom and Italy have, for example, established specific units or task forces to co-ordinate and map out responses to COVID-19 related disinformation (OECD, 2020[62]) .
Beyond communications, the level of health literacy of populations is a key issue to keep in mind with regard to tackling disinformation and an important element to consider for building trust. Given gaps in the public’s health knowledge, investing in health literacy is paramount to consider even before a crisis emerges. Centres of government are working to make their messages and contents more compelling and adapted to specific or vulnerable segments of the population. To this end, social media has emerged as a useful tool for crisis communication, with the potential to support two-way crisis communication at a low cost, and maintain trust in government by developing a more direct relationship with citizens (OECD, 2015[64]). Indeed, CoGs need to catch citizens’ attention in a crowded media ecosystem in which stakeholders are increasingly suffering from information overload.
The use of clear language and the customisation of communications material have also proven effective to share complex information with different segments of the population. Disseminating information in more than one language to reach specific groups has also been observed, such as in Sweden (City of Stockholm, 2020[65]), or Belgium where key messages were translated into 32 languages (Government of Belgium, 2020[66]). The cartoon figure “Susana Distancia”, designed by Mexico’s Health Ministry and adopted as the face of communication campaigns led by federal authorities helps share simple and clear information with all age segments of the population (El Universal, 2020[67]). Several other CoGs such as in France and the UK have promoted specific video, audio and written material on the virus for children that were developed by other parts of the government. The high level of uncertainty generated by the COVID-19 crisis means that decision makers must continue to prepare for a diverse range of scenarios in both the medium to the longer term. These relate to uncertainties not only surrounding the progression and duration of the medical crisis itself, but also the further cascading impacts for the future of the economy and society. Policy decisions based on untested or unreliable assumptions about the future (such as the expectation that current trends will continue or that conditions will revert naturally to the pre-COVID-19 state of affairs) can prove ineffective and even counterproductive when circumstances change. Governments can use strategic foresight approaches such as scanning for signs of change and preparing for multiple scenarios to promote greater resilience in the medium term. Various approaches can be used. A first approach is stress-testing and future-proofing policy proposals against a diversity of plausible future scenarios, and exploring possible unintended consequences. A second involves exploring further order consequences of the crisis and the new opportunities and challenges these could bring, in order to begin designing appropriate responses sooner. Finally, a third approach may entail broadening the understanding of what may be possible/desirable in the future in order to support more innovative policy thinking and design of policies that respond to present needs in ways that better advance longer-term goals. Together these steps can help strengthen the confidence of decision makers, citizens and other stakeholders (such as investors) that proposed government policies will be more robust and adaptive in face of an uncertain future. The CoG has many key roles in integrating strategic foresight into decision-making. These include collaborating with public sector foresight units to bring foresight into the deliberations, whether in the context of crisis management, or when shaping exit strategies and medium term recovery planning. There is the option of commissioning cross-government work to explore a diversity of possible future scenarios related to the implications of the crisis, and mandating ministries to future-proof their policy recommendations against such scenarios. This work can be led by existing foresight units housed within the CoG where these exist, for example, in Singapore, Finland, and Spain, or by working closely with other foresight units in the public service (as in the case for Canada and the United Kingdom). While foresight is crucial for responsible decision-making during a crisis, it is also a key ingredient to ensuring the government will be better prepared for other possible future disruptions and long-term structural transformations. 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